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The dilemmas of pro-development actors: viewing state–ethnic minority
relations and intra-ethnic dynamics through contentious development
projects
Duncan McDuie-Ra*
School of Social Sciences and International Studies, University of New South Wales,
Sydney, Australia
Studies of ethnic minority peoples in Asia have long focussed on the relations
between ethnic minority communities and the modern state and on the role of
development in shaping these relations. This paper is concerned with how ethnic
minorities respond to the state-led development. While there are numerous
studies focussing on the collective agency of ethnic minorities opposing
development projects, few studies consider the agency of pro-development actors.
Pro-development actors are usually dismissed as co-opted, manipulated,
inauthentic, or elite-driven, yet they can oﬀer crucial insights into understanding
state–ethnic minority relations and particularly intra-ethnic minority relations.
This paper concentrates on pro-dam actors from the Lepcha minority in the
Indian state of Sikkim to make four interlinked arguments. First, examining pro-
development actors breaks the homogenous view of state–ethnic minority
relations and shifts the focus to intra-ethnic relationships. Second, collective
agency of ethnic minorities is not ﬁxed in a particular relationship with the state
nor does it have a particular position on development. Third, the long-term
experience of development is vital in understanding how ethnic minorities
manoeuvre and alter their position on contentious projects. Lastly, analysis of
pro-development actors creates major dilemmas for researchers which are not
easily overcome.
Keywords: state–minority relations; intra-ethnic relations; development protests;
dam protests; Sikkim; Lepcha.
Introduction
In February 2009, after 599 days of a peaceful hunger strike in the state of Sikkim in
the Indian Himalayas, 43 members of the Aﬀected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) were
arrested on charges of trespassing, arson, theft, damage to property, and rioting after
allegedly causing major damage to the construction site of the Panan Dam in the
Dzongu reserve.1 The incident was the climax of four and half years of action by the
ACT and other organisations against dams on the Teesta River and its tributaries.
The ACT has claimed the dams proposed for the Dzongu reserve would irreversibly
damage the environment, culture, and sacred sites of the Lepcha ethnic minority.
During this period the protest against the dams became associated with a resurgent
*Email: d.mcduie@unsw.edu.au
1‘ACT Loses Cool on Landmark Day’, 1; ‘40 ACT Members Sent to JC’, 1.
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expression of Lepcha identity. For many academics, journalists, and commentators,
the protest demonstrated a familiar narrative: a numerically small ethnic minority,
classiﬁed as a ‘most primitive tribe’ by the Government of Sikkim and a ‘vanishing
tribe’ in popular nomenclature, ﬁghting against the development desires of the
modern state in order to protect ancestral lands, the environment, sacred sites, and
retain remnants of a ‘vanishing’ culture. It epitomised the clashes between modernity
and tradition, materiality and spirituality, development and the environment,
minority and majority, and people and state that have become familiar throughout
Asia in recent decades. The protests brought attention to Sikkim and the Lepcha
minority, raising further questions about the impacts of hydropower on communities
and the direction of development in India. In 2008 the Government of Sikkim
cancelled four of the ﬁve dam projects aﬀecting Dzongu, making the anti-dam
movement one of the most successful in recent decades. The remaining Panan dam
has now become a major ﬂashpoint between opponents and proponents from within
the Lepcha community, providing insights into the dynamics of state–ethnic
minority relations and intra-ethnic minority relations and the ways development
shapes these relations.
Beyond this narrative, there has been little attention paid to individuals and
organisations supporting the Panan dam. While the anti-dam movement has been
very well documented, Lepchas supporting the dam have been dismissed as minions
of the state who are either bought-oﬀ or naı¨ve. However, there are three crucial
elements of the pro-dam position that complicate such a hasty dismissal: (1) the
majority of supporters emerged from the area most aﬀected by the dam, the same
area most closely associated with the ‘pure’ Lepcha identity threatened by the
project, (2) supporters of the dam have made demands on the state to accelerate the
Panan project and negotiated a favourable agreement for compensation, and (3) they
have openly clashed with the opposition movement on a number of occasions over
who has the right to speak on behalf of the Lepchas of Dzongu.
By examining the pro-dam network in Dzongu this paper makes four
interlinked arguments transferable to other contexts. First, examining pro-
development actors breaks the homogenous view of state–ethnic minority
relations and shifts the focus to intra-ethnic relationships. Second, collective
agency of ethnic minorities is not ﬁxed in a particular relationship with the state
nor does it have a particular position on development. Third, while attention is
drawn to the crucial junctures when contentious development projects are
planned and opposed, the long-term experience of development and the state is
vital in understanding how ethnic minorities manoeuvre and alter their position.
Last, the analysis of pro-development actors creates dilemmas for researchers and
may explain why the familiar narrative is so attractive. No matter how diﬃcult
the dilemmas raised by pro-development actors are, in many cases it is even more
diﬃcult to dismiss these voices as spurious.
This article consists of ﬁve sections. The ﬁrst section sets out the ways in which
development shapes state–ethnic minority relations and continues to shape the ways
ethnic minority identities are constructed and reproduced in much of Asia. A
discussion of agency and contentious politics follows to address the question of how
ethnic minorities respond to state-led development initiatives. The second section
discusses the Lepcha minority in Sikkim and their relationship with the state and
other ethnic groups, focussing on the centrality of the ‘vanishing tribe’ discourse.
The third section discusses the anti-dam movement, the pro-dam network, and the
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conﬂicts between the two groups. The fourth section oﬀers a critical reading of the
pro-dam network, demonstrating the insights it oﬀers for further understanding of
state–ethnic minority relations and intra-ethnic minority relations. The ﬁnal section
concludes by arguing that insights gained from examining pro-development actors
can be extremely signiﬁcant for understanding state–ethnic minority relations and
the dynamics of collective agency, while at the same time raising dilemmas for
researchers.
Development and collective agency in the margins
Studies of ethnic minority peoples in Asia have long focussed on the relations
between ethnic minority communities and the modern state. The creation of ethnic
categories in colonial and postcolonial state-making have produced and reproduced
identities that have been internalised, contested, rejected, and renegotiated
throughout Asia. 2 As the study of identity has become ubiquitous across disciplines,
ethnic identity has also become an indispensable feature of understanding relations
between minority peoples and the state and between diﬀerent ethnic communities in
diﬀerent locations. Central to the relations between the state and ethnic minority
peoples is development. Regardless of how deﬁned, development ideas and processes
shape state–ethnic minority relations in a number of ways.
First, development is viewed as a form of control or coercion. From this
perspective development is used as a way of controlling ethnic minority peoples
through resettlement and/or permanent settlement, migration of members of other
communities into ethnic minority areas, land privatisation and appropriation,
reforms to customary land tenure, deforestation or denial of access to forests, the use
of development funds to cultivate loyalty and patronage in ethnic minority areas,
and ‘modernisation’ programs such as education, religious conversion or enforced
secularisation, the formalisation of institutions and systems of rule into state
structures, the extension of infrastructure to remote areas which is sometimes seen to
increase state control and access to resources while also facilitating the extension of
other development initiatives.3
Second, development is viewed as a process of bringing ethnic minorities deeper
into the social and cultural realm of the state. While the actual measures involved in
this process may be similar to those described immediately above, the outcome can
be thought of as less intent on control and domination and more on integration and
incorporation. Obviously this varies in diﬀerent states and under diﬀerent
governments, yet it can also vary between diﬀerent ethnic minority groups in the
same polity; some undergoing greater pressure for integration while others are
2Debate over whether ethnicity is a wholly colonial construction or existed in various forms
prior to colonisation is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the view of Proschan is
useful here, namely ‘imaginings (of ethnicity) produced during and after the colonial era
must . . . be seen as adoptions, transformations, modiﬁcations, or adaptations of pre-existing
local conceptions’. Proschan, ‘Peoples of the Gourd’, 1000, emphasis in the original.
3The literature on the various points listed here is vast and spans a number of disciplines. For a
small sample see Cao, Ethnic Minorities and Regional Development; Duncan, Civilizing the
Margins, 2004; Guo, State and Ethnicity; Hardy, Red Hills; Jonsson, Mien Relations; Peluso
and Vandergeest, ‘Genealogies of the Political Forest and Customary Rights’; Scott, Art of
Not Being Governed; van Schendel, ‘The Invention of The ‘‘Jummas’’’; Winzeler, Indigenous
Peoples and the State.
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granted more autonomy.4 As Scott argues, this ‘enclosure’ has been characterised by
resistant peoples moving to ‘non-state spaces’ to seek refuge from the power of states
rather than simply being unreachable or isolated.5 He adds that the accelerated
enclosure of non-state spaces in the past 50 years has altered the prospects of such
escape.6
Third, development is central to the ways ethnic minority identities are
constructed by the state, by dominant ethnic groups, and by other ethnic minorities.
Ethnic minorities are frequently viewed according to their level of ‘development’ vis-
a`-vis other groups within the state, and sometimes those beyond the state.7 One of
the most common ways that this is expressed is that particular ethnic minorities are
‘backward’ or at an earlier stage of development, frequently read as a continuum or
modiﬁcation of colonial categories such as ‘savage’ or ‘primitive’.8 Furthermore, the
‘backward’ construction is often used to legitimise development intervention by the
state and, increasingly, by non-state actors.9 Ethnic minorities are viewed as being in
the process of ‘catching up’ to dominant groups and development is the path that
must be followed. This has become a major point of diﬀerentiation in the
construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ for minorities when viewing dominant groups and
the state itself, and it has also become a crucial diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent
ethnic minority groups by the state, even when living in close proximity to each
other.10 In certain locations such constructions are reproduced by ethnic minorities
as part of their own positioning in relation to the state, other ethnic groups, and
resources.11
Fourth, development provides a set of opportunities and ‘goods’ that ethnic
minority groups actively pursue. This is much less discussed than the previous
three items, but empirical studies reveal the ways in which many ethnic minority
groups or their political aﬃliates campaign for an increase in development
activity in their localities, often as a response to both material need and
internalised constructions of their relative underdevelopment or backwardness
when compared to other communities.12 Thus development shapes state–ethnic
minority relations but it also underpins a set of demands that ethnic minorities
make on the state.
It is important to note that given the large number of actors involved in
development at the international, national, and local levels, state–ethnic minority
relations can be moderated by other actors. Aid donors, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) both national and international, and international organisa-
tions (IOs) involved in development often deal directly with ethnic minorities and/or
4Baruah, Durable Disorder; Callahan, Political Autonomy in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States;
Eilenberg, ‘Negotiating Autonomy at the Margins of the State’.
5Scott, Art of Not Being Governed, 22–32.
6Ibid., 11.
7Keyes, ‘Presidential Address: ‘‘The Peoples of Asia’’’; Michaud, ‘Handling Mountain
Minorities’.
8Kikon, ‘From Loincloth, Suits, to Battle Greens’, 83. It is important to stress that such
categories often built on existing conceptions of marginal communities. For a discussion of
this in the same empirical context as Kikon see Sakia, Fragmented Memories, 50–1.
9Barabantseva, ‘Development as Localization’; Sturgeon, Border Landscapes.
10Ibrahim, ‘Regional Development in Rural Malaysia’.
11Bal, ‘Becoming the Garos of Bangladesh’, 439–55; Friedman. ‘Embodying Civility’;
Santasombat, ‘Karen Cultural Capital’.
12McDuie-Ra, ‘Vision 2020 or Re-vision 1958’.
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advise governments on ethnic minority matters.13 This does not necessarily alter or
challenge the ways ethnic minorities are constructed or the practice of development
being undertaken by the state, though it may in some cases. In Sikkim the role of
donors, IOs, and NGOs working explicitly with ethnic minorities is limited and will
be of little concern here.
Given the ways development shapes material and ideational relations between
ethnic minorities and the state, and also between ethnic groups, scholars have
become concerned with the ways that ethnic minorities respond to development.
Responses take many forms, from resistance to contestation, from avoidance to
adaptation.14 The responses of ethnic minorities can be examined by focussing on
two concepts: agency and contentious politics. Despite their diﬀerent origins the
concepts are now used across disciplines, though there are subtle diﬀerences in focus.
Agency tends to be concerned with engagement that can take place between diﬀerent
groups and even individuals in response to opportunities aﬀorded by diﬀerent
institutional and social structures. In other words, the state does not need to be
present when considering agency. While recognising that the concept of agency is
subject to contention, the deﬁnition posed by Emirbayer and Mische will be adopted
here. They deﬁne agency as:
. . . a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (in its
habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as a capacity to imagine
alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to contextualize past
habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment).15
Analytically important are changes in agential orientation revealing choices and
manoeuvres in relation to the opportunities and constraints of context.16 Agency is
not simply the capacity to alter structures that order social life through rational
decision making or normative compulsion towards a pre-determined end, rather the
ends and means of human agency respond to ever-changing conditions and
contexts.17
Contentious politics focuses on collective action directed at the government or
the state – which can be temporally embedded social engagement as described
above – but has certain other requirements. The deﬁnition of contentious politics
outlined by McAdam et al. will be used here:
. . . episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects
when (a) at least one government is the claimant and (b) the claims would, if realized
aﬀect the interests of one of the claimants . . . (or) collective political struggle.18
Thus while the diﬀerences between the concepts are no doubt arenas of scholarly
debate, for the sake of clarity it will be argued that agency and contentious politics
complement each other by drawing attention to the capacity and contextual nature
13See Hagen, Creating a ‘New Nepal’.
14Duncan, ‘Legislating Modernity among the Marginalized’, 16. See also edited volume of
responses in the Mekong region; Leepreecha, McCaskill, and Buadaeng, Challenging the
Limits.
15Emirbayer and Mische, ‘What is Agency?’, 963. Parentheses in original.
16Ibid., 964.
17Ibid., 967.
18McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 5.
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of engagement on the one hand, and the collective nature of interaction on the other,
while also being cognisant of an overarching, though ﬂuid, purpose. For the study of
state–ethnic minority relations this draws us towards analysing collective agency of
ethnic minority movements and networks vis-a`-vis the state; in this case represented
by the Government of Sikkim.
Concern with collective agency in the margins of the modern state raises the
question: how, why, and to what ends do ethnic minorities respond to the state and
its methods of developing them? This is generally analysed in two main contexts: (1)
as part of long-term relations between the state, ethnic minorities and development
and (2) at crucial junctures when contentious development projects are planned and
opposed, particularly when visible protests take place. Often these contexts are
deeply interrelated, however, it is the latter that draw the most interest, particularly
when cast in the familiar narrative of ethnic minorities opposing contentious projects
and by extension the state, and in some analyses the very notion of development
itself. This has the eﬀect of situating ethnic minorities in a permanently adversarial
relationship with the state and development, setting up binaries that are diﬃcult to
break down analytically. Thus minority–majority, minority–state, and minority–
development become embedded categories and there are few accounts of
diﬀerentiated agency among ethnic minorities, particularly among more heavily
marginalised groups. In many cases these binaries are evident empirically, yet such
binaries cast ethnic minorities as homogenous wholes and lock our understanding of
collective agency into predetermined roles. As Guo has argued in the case of
relations between the state and ethnic minorities in southwest China, such thinking
creates a ‘uniﬁed front’ view of both ethnic minorities and the state which needs to be
challenged empirically.19
One obvious element left untouched by the ‘united front’ view is pro-
development actors among ethnic minorities. Few scholars are drawn to examining
them, yet they can provide crucial insights into the complexities of state–ethnic
minority relations and intra-ethnic politics. Often their visibility is reduced as they
complicate the familiar narrative of collective agency. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly
they create a set of dilemmas for researchers. First is the dilemma of authenticity.
Pro-development groups are generally seen to represent an elite or privileged voice
among ethnic minorities, especially one attributed to those who will proﬁt from
development projects. This is often the case but it should not necessarily be assumed
and, even when it is clearly the case, the divisions engendered by this kind of
patronage among ethnic minorities can provide important insights into state–ethnic
minority relations and intra-ethnic dynamics. Furthermore, answers to the questions
of who supports the development project, why, and if and how their perspective has
altered are also crucial to understanding the ‘choices and manoeuvres’ of collective
agency discussed above. The second is the dilemma of co-option. Many groups
expressing pro-development positions are seen as variously co-opted, manipulated,
or duped by the state or other agents of development. Again, members of ethnic
minority communities are often co-opted, they are manipulated and bought oﬀ, and
they are tricked and deceived; but not always. Furthermore, it is very diﬃcult from a
distance to distinguish between genuine expressions of support for development
projects and the use of certain representatives of ethnic minority communities by the
state to add legitimacy to their own designs. Thus this needs deeper empirical
19Guo, State and Ethnicity, 314.
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inquiry. The third is a moral dilemma. Development projects that rupture
communities and threaten their livelihoods and identities are generally perceived
to be against the interests of aﬀected peoples. Examining pro-development actors
gives exposure to voices that advocate such projects and puts many researchers on
uncomfortable moral ground as such research may be used by proponents of the
projects to lend further legitimacy and undermine opposition. These dilemmas are
real and do not disappear by simply adopting a diﬀerent viewpoint or rearranging
the terminology used. These dilemmas were raised constantly during ﬁeldwork for
this article and staying true to the views expressed by respondents was a constant
challenge. However, pursuing research among pro-development members of the
Lepcha ethnic group also revealed a number of crucial insights into the relations
between ethnic minorities, the state, and development, and also within ethnic
minority communities at the centre of such projects. Before the contentious project
and the various collective positions of diﬀerent Lepcha groups are discussed, the
following section will introduce ethnic relations in Sikkim.
The Lepcha minority in Sikkim
Sikkim is a federal state in the Indian Union and is located in the Himalayas. Sikkim
borders Bhutan, China (Tibet), Nepal, and the Darjeeling District of the Indian state
of West Bengal. It is populated by three main ethnic groups; Bhutias, Lepchas, and
Nepalis, oﬃcially classiﬁed as ‘Sikkim subjects’ since 1961.20 When Sikkim merged
with India in 1975, Sikkim subjects were made citizens of India and, theoretically, no
new persons could be classiﬁed in this category except for descendants and spouses
of existing subjects.21 Ethnicity in Sikkim can be complex, but has been simpliﬁed by
the state into the subcategories of Bhutia, Lepcha, and Nepali. This article
concentrates on the Lepcha as they are at the centre of protests over dams in the
Dzongu reserve in North Sikkim.
As can be expected, Sikkimese history is detailed and contested; however, the
simpliﬁed view of the past used by the state to construct identities and ethnic
categories will be used here as this informs the categories of ethnicity that have the
most impact on everyday life. The Lepchas are considered the earliest inhabitants of
today’s Sikkim and the Darjeeling District of West Bengal, practising shifting
cultivation and hunter-gathering in apparent isolation. Bhutia immigration from
Tibet and Bhutan into Sikkim has taken place in various waves over several centuries
and by 1642 a Tibetan theocracy was established in Sikkim under the rule of the
Chogyal (or ‘King’).22 Bhutia immigrants were lamas, traders, and livestock herders;
the latter pushing the Lepcha into forests and lower valleys. All land in Sikkim was
property of the Chogyal who distributed this to landlords known as Kazi who were
predominantly Bhutia in ethnicity; they were empowered to appoint headmen
(mondals) who could rent land for cultivation or dwellings, leaving Lepchas
economically and politically marginalised. Inter-marriage between Bhutia aristocrats
20Datta. ‘Ethnicity and Resource Management’, 77.
21There is also a signiﬁcant population of ‘plains’ people particularly from Bengal and
Rajasthan running businesses and working for the central government, some of whom have
been in Sikkim for several generations.
22Mullard argues the accuracy of this date is contentious and its acceptance owes to the later
need to perpetuate a ‘coronation myth’ to maintain the power of the Chogyal. Mullard, ‘The
‘‘Tibetan’’ formation’, 43–4.
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and Lepcha chiefs followed by conversion to Buddhism meant integration in the
upper levels of society, and discrimination at other levels.23
After the British gained political control of Sikkim in 1888, the ethnic
composition altered dramatically under the Political Oﬃcer J.C. White. White saw
immigration, particularly from Nepal, as necessary to provide labour for agriculture
and the newly established tea plantations, for building roads and other
infrastructure, and for increasing taxation.24 Nepalis migrated as labourers but
were also willing to farm wastelands and clear forest for terraced agriculture,
reducing the already scant amount of land for shifting cultivation, and further
pushing Lepchas, who were neither landlords nor intensive cultivators, to the
margins. By the turn of the twentieth century, after internal administration was
handed back to the Chogyal, Nepalis were the majority population of Sikkim,
governed by a minority Bhutia ruling class. Under these circumstances an
administrative division was created between the ‘migrant’ Nepalis and ‘non-migrant’
Bhutia and Lepcha populations of Sikkim. Revenue Order No.1 of 1917 prohibited
the sale or transfer of Bhutia or Lepcha land to members of other ethnic groups.25
Further restrictions were placed on Nepali migrants serving as oﬃcers or headmen.
These measures pushed the Bhutia and Lepcha ethnic groups into a ‘composite’
ethnic group,26 and similarly, though with far less critical or scholarly recognition,
pushed the various non-Bhutia and Lepcha people from diﬀerent ethnic groups into
the composite category ‘Nepali’.27 The category Bhutia-Lepcha, or ‘BL’ in everyday
parlance in contemporary Sikkim, has persisted and is the basis for reserved seats in
parliament, government employment, and educational institutions. This has left the
Lepcha as the minority ‘partner’ in the minority BL category.
It has been argued throughout the past century that both the BL category and the
common Sikkimese identity have eroded a separate Lepcha identity, leading to
claims that they are a ‘dying race’28 and a ‘vanishing tribe’.29 Plaiser claims that the
most recent statistical data estimates there to be slightly fewer than 30,000 Lepcha
speakers,30 though it is important to note that many people who are ethnically
Lepcha are not Lepcha speakers. The concept of the ‘vanishing tribe’, the term
coined by the Lepcha civil servant turned author Arthur Foning and the title of his
inﬂuential 1987 book, has been strongly internalised. Bentley writes that the ‘notion
of a vanishing Lepcha culture or even of the entire Lepcha tribe is expressed by every
member of Lepcha society: urban and rural, male and female, young and old,
educated and uneducated’.31 She adds that ‘for all of them losing Lepcha culture has
become an integral part of describing Lepcha culture’.32
In the last decade the Government of Sikkim has responded by ensuring that
Lepcha culture and identity is protected. Lepcha is one of 11 oﬃcial languages, it is
23Gorer, Himalayan Village, 36.
24McKay, ‘The Indigenisation of Western Medicine’, 25.
25Revenue Order No. 1 was enacted in 1917 and still forms the basis of land transfer laws in
Sikkim, particularly the Sikkim Transfer of Land Regulation Bill of 1989.
26Hiltz, ‘Constructing Sikkimese National Identity’; Nakane, ‘A Plural Society’.
27Shneiderman and Turin, ‘Seeking the Tribe’, 54.
28Gorer, Himalayan Village, 37.
29Foning, Lepcha My Vanishing Tribe.
30Plaisier, ‘Lepcha Orthography and Literature’, 7.
31Bentley, ‘Change and Culture Revival’, 60.
32Ibid., 60.
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taught in schools, there are Lepcha language textbooks, Lepcha editions of the
government newspaper and certain documents, Lepcha language radio broadcasts,
and the prominent Lepcha Cultural Association that promotes Lepcha literature,
handicrafts, archery, and festivals. These oﬃcial spaces for the expression of Lepcha
culture do not exist among the Lepchas of the Darjeeling Hills, or among Lepchas in
the Ilam district of Nepal, or those in the Samsi district of Bhutan.33 As a result there
is, at least at a certain ‘oﬃcial’ level, a more visible Lepcha identity in Sikkim than
among Lepchas living in surrounding areas. Religion also plays a role in these
diﬀerences, with most Lepcha in the Darjeeling Hills following Christianity, while
those in Sikkim, particularly North Sikkim, are predominantly Buddhist with some
following the traditional Lepcha religion.34
In recent years the Government of Sikkim has undertaken further measures to
diﬀerentiate between certain ethnic groups and sub-groups within its population.
One of these is the classiﬁcation of Lepchas as the ‘most primitive tribal group’
passed by the Sikkim Assembly in 2005 in order to ‘protect and safeguard the
vanishing tribe and to uplift their socio-economic, educational, and political
status . . . and to give them a distinct identity and special status’.35 While the Bhutia-
Lepcha category still exists, Lepchas have a further means of accessing state
reservations. As Shneiderman and Turin have commented, ‘the previously
unassailable category of Scheduled Tribe had just been upstaged by the new
category of Most Primitive Tribe’.36 For the Lepcha community of Sikkim, most
primitive tribe status reinforced the vanishing tribe preoccupation, and oﬃcial
diﬀerentiation from the Bhutias set the stage for more vocal expressions of Lepcha
ethnic identity. Contesting dams has occurred in this context.
Of all the protective measures for Lepchas, none is more signiﬁcant than the
Dzongu reserve. Dzongu (also spelt Jongu or Zongu) is a Lepcha reserve with a
population of approximately 7000 people. Dzongu was declared a special protected
area through Notiﬁcation 3069 in 1956 and this was kept intact at the time of the
merger with India in 1975. Entry restrictions are strict, even Lepchas from other
parts of Sikkim are not allowed to settle in Dzongu, and most outsiders can only
gain permits for short visits. All land in Dzongu is Lepcha owned and though it can
be leased to non-Lepcha labourers, work permits are only given through
the invitation of a Dzongu resident and these have to be renewed every year.37 If
the Lepcha are simultaneously dying, vanishing, and primitive, then Dzongu is the
lifeline to the Lepcha past.
As a consequence, Dzongu has long been a drawcard for anthropologists and
ethnographers seeking access to Lepcha culture before it ‘disappears’.38 Perhaps the
most famous colonial era account of the Lepchas is Geoﬀrey Gorer’s Himalayan
Village, based on ﬁeldwork in Dzongu and still in print today. Gorer states that ‘it is
only in Zongu and in one or two villages outside the reserve that there is a
homogenous Lepcha society, practically undisturbed by alien inﬂuence’.39 He
considers this ‘artiﬁcial’, arguing that without the benevolence of the Chogyal in
33Plaisier, ‘Lepcha Orthography and Literature’, 8.
34Bentley, ‘Change and Culture Revival’, 64.
35‘State Notiﬁcation’, 1
36Shneiderman and Turin, ‘Seeking the Tribe’, 58.
37Bentley, ‘Change and Culture Revival’, 67.
38Plaisier, ‘In Awe of so Many Mu´ng.
39Gorer, Himalayan Village, 37.
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granting the reserve ‘these Lepchas would, like their fellows, have been ousted from
what little and poor land remains to them’.40 Foning writes of time spent in Dzongu
in the late 1940s and in My Vanishing Tribe he refers to it as ‘the dreamland of our
modern Lepcha world’.41 Dzongu has signiﬁcance beyond its size and population.
For Lepchas outside Dzongu it signiﬁes the remains of all that has been ‘lost’, a
resource for reproducing ethnic identity at a time when changes to ethnic categories
make identity particularly salient. With such signiﬁcance the proposal to build ﬁve
large dams in Dzongu changed the political landscape in Sikkim, and triggered new
forms of collective agency among the Lepcha.
Contentious dams in Dzongu
Sikkim has long been targeted for hydropower investment, but it was not until the
1980s that major dam projects were commissioned. There are currently 29
hydropower projects at various stages of implementation in Sikkim. Five of these
would have been built in the Dzongu reserve. While there have been protests against
other dam projects in Sikkim, most notably the Rathongchu project in North Sikkim
in the 1990s,42 this article will focus on the Dzongu dams only as they allow
examination of the dimensions of development in state–ethnic minority relations and
the collective agency of ethnic minorities participating in contentious politics.
Proposals for dams on the Teesta River, which ﬂows from the high Himalayas
through Sikkim into West Bengal, go back to the 1970s, but it was not until the late
1990s that feasibility studies and impact assessments started to take place. As the
Indian power sector opened up to private investment in the early 1990s, the
Government of Sikkim began trying to attract investors to the state, resulting in a
comprehensive hydropower policy in 1998. Environmental clearance for the Teesta
dams was granted in 1999, and in 2002 26 companies were chosen to sign agreements
with the Government of Sikkim to begin the projects.43 In the following years the
Government of Sikkim and the relevant commissioned companies began to hold
community consultations and negotiate memorandums of understanding (MoU)
with aﬀected communities. It was during these consultations that the projects began
to be questioned and opposed. This section will ﬁrst focus on the opposition
movement to the Dzongu dams before turning attention to the pro-dam network.
The anti-dam movement
The detailed events surrounding opposition to the Dzongu dams have been
extensively reported and documented in the local and national print media, through
several websites and weblogs, and in articles by Arora,44 Little,45 and Wangchuk.46
While the number of arguments from the diﬀerent groups involved, incidents, and
changes of position are well beyond the scope of this article, there are several key
actors and episodes that will be outlined. The main opposition group, the Aﬀected
40Ibid.
41Foning, My Vanishing Tribe, 268.
42Arora, ‘Text and Context’.
43Dutta, ‘Lepcha v Hydropower’.
44Arora, ‘Unheard Voices’; Arora, ‘Gandhigiri in Sikkim’.
45Little, ‘Deep Ecology, Dams.
46Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’.
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Citizens of Teesta (ACT), emerged in 2004. The ACT worked publicly and behind
the scenes to oppose all the dam projects in Sikkim, but soon focussed solely on the
Dzongu dams. They called for all ﬁve Dzongu dams to be cancelled, four of which
were cancelled in 2008.47 They based their opposition on four main claims: (1) the
dams would aﬀect the cultural fabric of the Dzongu reserve and the threatened
Lepcha minority, (2) the inﬂux of labourers and other outsiders would have a
negative impact on life in Dzongu, (3) the dams would destroy sacred landscapes
intrinsic to Lepcha identity, and (4) the dams would damage the environment of
Dzongu and threaten the Kanchenjunga Biosphere Reserve.48 As Arora notes:
[f]or the Lepchas, the implementation of the Teesta hydel project and the loss of Dzongu
(the ancient Lepcha reserve) may result in ethnocide, the disappearance of their cultural
heritage that is rooted to their ancestral connections and performance of rituals
connected to the land, forests, mountains, lakes, and nature, in general.49
In the period between 2004 and early 2009 the ACT mobilised residents to block
inspection teams, organised marches to Dzongu and rallies in Gangtok, maintained
a vocal presence at public hearings, built linkages with anti-dam movements in other
parts of India, and entered into talks with the state and central governments.50 Other
organisations have become involved, most notably the Concerned Lepchas of
Sikkim (CLOS) and the Rong Ong Prongzom (Lepcha Youth Organisation) from
Darjeeling in neighbouring West Bengal.
The anti-dam movement gained a new dimension, and a broader following, when
Dawa Lepcha of the ACT and Tenzing Lepcha from the CLOS went on a hunger
strike in June 2007. The hunger strike was relayed in Dzongu too, and the Weeping
Sikkim weblog51 set up to monitor the hunger strike drew attention from the rest of
India and the world. Over the ensuing months the Government of Sikkim reacted by
suspending the Dzongu dams, constituting a review committee, and initiating talks
with the ACT and other opposition groups. The ACT and the government entered
talks on several occasions, but government promises failed to materialise. The ACT
and supporters went to New Delhi where, as Wanchuk reports, ‘the rallies and
meetings . . . wore a completely Lepcha ﬂavour and the memorandums spoke only of
Dzongu.’52 Further actions took place, including the forming of the Lepcha Holy
Land Protection Joint Action Committee, and the angle of the protests shifted away
from environmental concerns, and even concerns over migration, to contesting the
dams as threats to the Lepcha holy land, sacred not only to Lepchas in Dzongu but
all Lepchas in the Himalayas. In March 2008 a Lepcha ﬂag was inaugurated by the
ACT and used in public rallies in Gangtok. In the same month the Chief Minister of
Sikkim announced that four of the ﬁve dams in Dzongu would be cancelled, leaving
only the Panan dam. The ACT vowed to continue their opposition until there were
no dams in Dzongu, channelling all energy into opposing the Panan dam.
Opposition to the Dzongu dams became a catalyst for a nascent Lepcha identity
movement. This gained momentum as Lepchas have rarely had a prominent political
voice in Sikkim. The creation of a Lepcha ﬂag, the naming of Dzongu as a holy land,
47These were the Lingza, Ringpi, Rangyong, and Rukel hydropower projects.
48Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’, 35.
49Arora, ‘Unheard Voices’, 3453.
50Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’, 39–41.
51http//:www.weepingsikkim.blogspot.com.
52Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’, 49.
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and the linking of the Dzongu dams to the ‘vanishing tribe’ were its key components.
Not only did the opposition movement contest the authority of the state and resist
the state’s version of development, but collective agency itself was the catalyst for a
more strongly articulated Lepcha identity, articulating both its fragility and its
emergent political strength. The collective agency of the Lepcha groups opposing the
Dzongu dams captured the imagination of scholars, activists, and the regional
media. For example, Little describes a meeting in December 2006 in Gangtok at a
particularly tense time in negotiations between the ACT and the government and
surmises that:
They are known for their shy, quiet persona but that day 500 or more Lepchas, from the
remote North of Sikkim . . . discover their loud voices and they holler and clap and laugh
and yell their support for the group who will lead them in this ﬁght for their sacred land
and culture.53
Signiﬁcantly, Medha Patkar, a well known anti-dam activist and veteran of the
Narmada Bachao Aandolan movement visited the hunger strikers in Gangtok in
July 2007 and lambasted the Government of Sikkim, bringing the anti-dam
movement into the fold of mainstream Indian environmental activism. Comparisons
began to be drawn to other movements in the Indian past and present such as the
Chipko movement against deforestation in Uttaranchal, the Narmada Bachao
Aandolan anti-dam movement in central India, and even to the anti-colonial
resistance of the Indian independence movement. The deeply symbolic hunger strike
appealed to a national (and international) audience to whom the concept of
satyagraha, or non-violent resistance, is deeply embedded and ‘remains the
dominant . . . idiom of dissent’.54 Indeed the idea of the Lepcha protest as satyagraha
has gained currency. As Arora writes:
Sitting under a white-silken ‘khada’ covered picture of Mahatma Gandhi and listening
to sacred Buddhist chants, surrounded by their supporters, the activists continue
undaunted in their struggle . . . Concerned Lepcha men and women are participating in
this indeﬁnite relay satyagraha while Buddhist lamas and Lepcha shamans are
performing rituals at the venue of the hunger strike.55
This added further legitimacy and impetus to the movement, particularly outside
Sikkim, but at the local level the movement generated conﬂict, not only between this
nascent Lepcha movement and the state but among the Lepcha population itself.
Evidence of the extent of divisions came in April 2008 when a pilgrimage to
Dzongu by between 500 and 700 Lepchas organised by the anti-dam movement
sparked hostile reactions from locals as they moved through parts of Sikkim. The
confrontation came to head on the bridge over the Teesta entering Dzongu, where a
counter rally of around 500 Lepchas held the pilgrimage group out of Dzongu
claiming that they were disrupting the debate on the dam and turning it into an
ethnic issue.56 The confrontation and the arrest of ACT members and accusations of
sabotage in February 2009 described at the start of this article furthered the tensions
53Little, ‘Lepcha Narratives’, 234. Similar scenes are recalled by Little in a later article
emphasising the sacral ecological elements of the protest and its non-violent nature. Little,
‘Deep Ecology, Dams’, 41, 45, 51.
54Vajpeyi, ‘Resenting the Indian State’, 29.
55Arora, ‘Unheard Voices’, 3451. See also Little, ‘Deep Ecology, Dams’, 45–7.
56Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’, 54.
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between the anti-dam movement and the dam supporters. As a result the anti-dam
movement came to be viewed as a movement of Lepchas from outside Dzongu
(though indeed many of the opponents of the project including hunger strikers were
originally from Dzongu) and the network of dam supporters came to be viewed as
composed of Lepchas from inside Dzongu.
Pro-dam groups in Dzongu
During this same period of 2004 a group of Lepchas supporting the dams in Dzongu
emerged. The pro-dam groups are less of a movement and more of a network of
NGOs, political leaders, and public servants with some ties with larger Lepcha
organisations in Gangtok. They lack the coherence of the anti-dam movement which
came into being by opposing the dams and rely instead upon a shared position
among existing actors. This network is rarely mentioned in the accounts of the
project and has attracted little interest from scholars, activists, or the media.
However, there are several factors that warrant closer analysis. First, the pro-dam
network is centred within Dzongu itself. As Dzongu will bear the brunt of the
environmental degradation and demographic transformation from the dam, it is
signiﬁcant that there is support for the project from people living in the locations
where this transformation will take place. Second, far from being passive spectators
of the state’s hydropower plans, the pro-dam network has pressured the state to
accelerate the dam projects. Representatives of communities in upper-Dzongu
negotiated and signed a comprehensive MoU with the Government of Sikkim and
the private hydropower contractor in 2006 that gives major concessions to the
community. Armed with this agreement a delegation of 500 Lepchas from Dzongu
drove to Gangtok in July 2007 to ‘reiterate their support’ for the Panan dam and
pressure the government to continue.57 Third, the pro-dam network has clashed with
the anti-dam movement in and near Dzongu and tensions between the groups have
escalated. This is signiﬁcant for members of an ethnic group constructed as peaceful
and docile and also because inter-ethnic violence is rare in Sikkim and intra-ethnic
violence almost unheard of. This begs the question: what are members of the pro-
dam network ﬁghting for, particularly when the project appears to be nothing short
of a disaster for the people of Dzongu? There is a more complex narrative at play
here and a focus only on collective agency in opposing the dams misses out on crucial
aspects of this alternative narrative.
During two periods of ﬁeld research in 2008 and 2009, interviews were conducted
in Dzongu among Lepcha leaders involved in the pro-dam network to diﬀerent
degrees. The only remaining dam going ahead at this time was the Panan dam
located in upper Dzongu near the village of Laven. The 11 respondents interviewed
included members of the sole NGO in Dzongu, the president and former president of
the same NGO, leaders from four of the ﬁve Gram Panchayat units of local
government, the head of the community welfare department in Dzongu,
representatives from Dzongu in the state government in Gangtok, a high-level local
employee on the project, and members of other Lepcha organisations supporting the
project in Gangtok. While the sample size appears small, for a community of 7000
people it represents the most signiﬁcant ﬁgures in leadership positions and those
most vocally supportive of the dams.
57Ibid., 45.
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The main organisation supporting the dams in Dzongu is the Mutanchi Lom Aal
Shezum (MLAS). MLAS holds a prominent position in Dzongu and is considered as
the sole NGO for the Lepcha of Dzongu. It combines cultural preservation projects
with livelihood generation and more conventional social welfare. MLAS has a high
level of legitimacy and authenticity within Dzongu, as Bentley writes, ‘the members
of MLAS are regarded as culturally knowledgeable people . . . their authority in
cultural matters runs parallel to that of elders and ritual specialists’.58 This has
brought the organisation respect but also criticism.59 MLAS claims that over 90% of
the population of Dzongu support the dam, though diﬀerent ﬁgures were quoted by
other members of the organisation. While it is impossible to verify these ﬁgures it is
clear that the support and legitimacy MLAS has in Dzongu is a major factor in
people in the area supporting the dam.
Other prominent supporters include the elected heads of the two most aﬀected
Gram Panchayats: Lingthem and Sakyong-Pentong, as well as leaders of the several
other Gram Panchayats in Dzongu, including Tingvong. In October 2007 elections
to the Gram Panchayats were cast by the Government of Sikkim as a referendum on
hydropower.60 Voter turnout in North Sikkim, of which Dzongu is a part and where
the majority of dams in Sikkim are planned, was recorded at 95%.61 The winning
candidates in the Gram Panchayats of Dzongu thus declared that they had a
mandate to pressure the government to accelerate the dams. Support has also come
from the Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarjum, the main Lepcha organisation in
Sikkim (not just Dzongu), and certain inﬂuential Lepchas in the government and the
ruling Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) party. What became clear during ﬁeld
research was that a dense network underpinned these supporters; whether this
network facilitated the emergence of the pro-dam network or whether it developed
through shared support for the dam is unclear.
Members of the pro-dam network make three main claims in favour of the Panan
dam: (1) the dam will provide economic and social development in Dzongu, (2) the
dam will ‘open-up’ Dzongu, and (3) the dam will help to save, not destroy, Lepcha
culture. These will be discussed brieﬂy in turn.
(1) Economic and social development of Dzongu
Supporters of the dam argue that the dam will bring development to a ‘backward’
area.62 Initially there was opposition to the project in Dzongu as many feared an
inﬂux of labourers from outside Sikkim coming to work on the dam,63 but after
MLAS negotiated the MoU64 with the government and the hydropower company it
was stipulated that no labourers on the project could settle in Dzongu, none could
58Bentley, ‘Change and Culture Revival’, 75.
59Ibid., 76.
60Wangchuk, ‘Lepchas and Hydel Protest’, 51.
61Ibid., 52.
62President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India.
63Former Head of the Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarjum, interview conducted by the author,
November 19, 2008, Gangtok, Sikkim, India.
64All information on the MoU comes from the document ‘Memorandum of Understanding
with Respect to Construction of Pananng [sic] Hydropower Project at Dzongu Constituency’,
viewed and cited with permission November 26–7, 2008.
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obtain voting rights, and executives of the hydropower company must be housed
outside Dzongu. Furthermore, priority in employment should be given to people
from Dzongu and one person from each household aﬀected by the dam should be
given a position in the company for the duration of the project. All provisions
supplied to the contractors must come from Dzongu businesses and all associated
contracting must ﬁrst go through the Dzongu Contractors Association. Respondents
argue that these agreements led to the largest shift in the popular opinion in Dzongu
towards favouring the project.65
The MoU also makes provisions for 5% of proﬁts from the dam to go back into
the community, an additional 4% towards community welfare (which would by
default be provided by MLAS as the only NGO), the company must re-forest the
entire area after the project has been completed, provide free electricity to all
residents of Dzongu for 50 years (though this has not been agreed to), and provide
ongoing educational scholarships to Dzongu youth to study outside Dzongu for the
next 35 years. Other aspects include setting up a bank in Dzongu, a new school with
computer facilities in the town of Laven, and money for gompas (temples), road
upgrades and new road construction.
Additionally, landowners in the area, all of whom are Lepcha by law, were
oﬀered up to nine times the market value for land required for the projects.66 This
has been the main basis for dismissing the pro-dam network as illegitimate or
inauthentic.67 Conversely it has allowed MLAS to argue that many areas claimed as
government land were in fact owned by Lepchas but they did not have the legally
recognised title. Thus as part of the MoU process land rights for many farmers in
Dzongu were recognised legally for the ﬁrst time and they were compensated
accordingly, garnering further support for the project. Attempts were also made to
control the extent of development. For example, no signboards are allowed in
Dzongu, no further dams can be considered, and all existing traditional laws must be
safeguarded (though this is not speciﬁed any further).
(2) Opening-up Dzongu
Related to the above point is the desire expressed by MLAS and other respondents
to ‘open-up’ Dzongu, particularly for tourism. Tourism in Sikkim is well established,
particularly so-called ‘eco-tourism’ which is intensely promoted by the state
government and the national tourism authorities. Given the restricted status of
Dzongu very few beneﬁts from tourism have reached the area, but the potential for
the dam to bring tourism revenue to Dzongu is attractive to the pro-dam network.
The MoU contains several provisions for tourist infrastructure to be provided
including trekking routes, pony facilities, the upkeep of monasteries, and home stay
facilities. Respondents also envisaged that the reservoir created by the dam could
become a tourist lake with paddle boats and other facilities, much like those found in
65Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 1, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
66President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India.
67With a rare mention of the pro-dam position Little writes, ‘the pro-dam supporters, 116 who
have sold land for the Panan 280 MW project, see a more aﬄuent Dzongu’. Little, ‘Deep
Ecology, Dams’, 39.
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other parts of the Himalayas.68 The MoU also contains provisions for the
construction of a community centre and museum at Namprickdang, which is a
village close to the ‘border’ between Dzongu and the rest of Sikkim. Construction of
this museum has been completed and the design is a traditional Lepcha house, much
like the ones spotted in parts of Dzongu, but enlarged and made from concrete. The
inside is ﬁlled with ‘traditional’ Lepcha farming tools and weavings. MLAs have big
plans for this site, including a handicraft market and traditional dancing for
tourists.69
The need for permits to enter Dzongu means that tourists will have to take part
in guided tours of the area in order to gain permission, and MLAS is already
facilitating these in small numbers and using village houses for home stays.
Respondents pointed out that this was an excellent way to create local employment
for villagers and also for educated but underemployed Lepchas who could act as
tour guides. When asked about the ability to control the impacts of tourism,
particularly in a region that is upheld as home to a ‘vanishing’ ethnic group with a
fragile cultural and natural environment, one of the Gram Panchayat leaders said
that a committee would be set up to regulate tourism and monitor the kinds of
tourists that would be allowed into Dzongu.70 He questioned what beneﬁt anyone in
the region has gained from being a protected area, a sentiment echoed by other
respondents.71
(3) Saving Lepcha culture
Pro-dam advocates argue that the dam would be a way to save Lepcha culture from
vanishing by ensuring that Dzongu Lepchas had a future and did not all leave for the
larger towns where they were more likely to lose their language and culture.72
Tourism would also enable people in Dzongu to revalue their traditions and enable
traditional practices to survive.73 There was the belief among respondents that
Lepchas outside Dzongu had lost much of their culture and were insecure about it,
which led to their opposition to the dams, whereas traditions in Dzongu had
persevered and were unlikely to disappear.74 When questioned about this assurance
they said that the MoU guarantees the economic future of Dzongu which is the best
way to ensure that Lepcha culture remains intact.75 As one member of MLAS
argued, without the dam no one will stay in Dzongu. The young people who go out
for education forget their culture and their language and in ﬁve to ten years there
68Employee of the Himagiri Hydropower Company 1, interview conducted by the author,
November 27, 2008, Laven, Sikkim, India.
69Member of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum 1, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India; President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum, interview
conducted by the author, November 25, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India.
70Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 2, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
71Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 3, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
72Former President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum, interview conducted by the author,
November 26, 2008, Passingdang, Sikkim, India.
73Ibid.
74Member of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum 1, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
75Ibid.
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would be no more knowledge of Lepcha ways in Dzongu.76 Thus the dam becomes a
way to codify aspects of Lepcha culture before they disappear forever. The
embedded nature of the ‘vanishing tribe’ can be seen here. Ironically, the ‘vanishing
tribe’ argument is one of the primary arguments of the anti-dam movement; both
sides couching their argument around the same sense of vulnerability.
Reading pro-development actors in Dzongu
Support for the dam comes from a mixture of support for Dzongu based
organisations such as MLAS and elected local leaders, as a way of redressing state
neglect, and as a result of resentment directed at Lepcha groups from outside
Dzongu trying to speak on behalf of the people living in Dzongu itself. A breakdown
of these facets reveals that while a level of elite manipulation has taken place,
support for the dam is based on choices and manoeuvres in response to opportunities
provided by the dam and as a response to the context in which people in Dzongu ﬁnd
themselves. This helps to construct an alternative narrative about state–ethnic
minority relations and intra-ethnic relations among the Lepcha.
There are four main facets that warrant closer scrutiny. First, there is no doubt
that MLAS, the Panchayati leaders (many of whom are members of the ruling SDF
party), and the Lepcha organisations in Gangtok have a stake in the political status
quo in Sikkim. Several of the respondents interviewed, particularly those of an older
generation and from the more established Lepcha cultural associations, argued that
it was a mistake to oppose the state as the Lepcha depended on the goodwill of the
dominant ethnic groups and the government to survive.77 Turning the dam into a
Lepcha identity issue was exposing the group to a backlash from other communities
and would threaten the survival of the ethnic group.78 The promises of a high rate of
compensation for land acquired for the dam is a major incentive for landowners to
support the project, however land tenure is Dzongu is less stratiﬁed than in other
parts of Sikkim and thus the perception of a wealthy landowning class articulating
their interests and silencing the landless would be misleading. However, even given
the incentives for elite support for the dam this does not fully explain why so many
ordinary people in Dzongu support the project and have mobilised on a number of
occasions to pressure the state into faster implementation of the project and to
confront anti-dam protestors. It could be that these people are simply following the
lead of trusted elites in supporting the project and/or the support that ordinary
people have for the promises of development enshrined in the project. Though there
appears more to it than this alone.
Interestingly both the anti- and pro-dam groups have been accused of being
manipulated by party politics. One of the state’s opposition parties, the Sikkim
Himali Rajya Parishad Party, publicly spoke out against the arrest and sabotage
allegations against ACT members in February 2009 and pushed for their release.79
The party argued that the actions of the ACT were justiﬁed as non-Sikkimese
workers were residing in Dzongu. The party clearly wanted to capture support for
76Ibid.
77Former Head of the Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarjum, interview conducted by the author,
November 19, 2008, Gangtok, Sikkim, India.
78Ibid.
79‘SHRPP Justiﬁes Act of ACT’.
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the anti-dam movement and use it against the ruling SDF party, though the Lepcha
element was downplayed in favour of the generic rhetoric against non-Sikkimese
migrants to broaden its appeal. Similar incidents, such as the burning of an eﬃgy of
the Governor of Sikkim in mid-2007 by people aligned with the Congress (I) Party,
also in opposition, led pro-dam actors to accuse the anti-dam movement of being
supported by forces that oppose the ruling SDF party and the Chief Minister80 and
of being captured by narrow political party interests. Conversely, the anti-dam
movement has long accused the pro-dam networks of being puppets of the state and
the ruling SDF party.
Second, support for the dam comes in response to state neglect and a perceived
lack of development in Dzongu. The dam comes at a time when disillusionment with
the advantages of scheduled tribe status and most primitive tribe status is growing,
aspirations of young Dzongu Lepchas educated outside the area are changing, and
livelihood prospects after the demise of the cardamom industry are diminishing. All
respondents in Dzongu cited the decline of cardamom as a key reason to pursue the
dam.81 The lucrative large cardamom industry brought Dzongu into the mainstream
cash economy in the second half of the twentieth century. Within a generation
Lepchas in Dzongu went from shifting cultivators to landowners able to lease their
land to migrant labourers. In recent decades the cardamom industry has been slowly
dying from a combination of old bushes, fungal disease, and falling prices.82 In the
1980s, yields began to decline and a by the mid-1990s they were at 60% of 1975 levels
despite more land under cultivation.83 Bentley demonstrates that in Dzongu the
average yield has declined to less than half of what it was ﬁve years previously and
many houses no longer have any cardamom to farm.84
In this context support for the Panan dam has grown. Several respondents in
Dzongu maintain that Lepchas were exploited by non-Lepchas in the cardamom
boom years leaving them with little to show aside from better houses and
educated children.85 Many members of the younger generation of Dzongu
Lepchas have been educated in urban areas and have little interest in returning to
the land. With the main source of livelihoods gone the dam has been framed as a
way to recreate livelihoods in a dead local economy.86 This was summed up by
one respondent who urged that the community should embrace the dam and
80Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 4, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
81Head of the Community Welfare Department in Dzongu, interview conducted by the
author, November 26, 2008, Passingdang, Sikkim, India; Former President of the Mutanchi
Lom Aal Shezum, interview conducted by the author, November 26, 2008, Passingdang,
Sikkim, India; Member of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum 2, interview conducted by the
author, November 26, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India.
82Bentley cites Spices Board of India ﬁgures that show the price per kilogram of cardamom in
2001 to be 188 rupees per kilogram (approx 4.70 USD) in Sikkim and 202 rupees per kilogram
(approx 5.05 USD) in Siliguri, the main trading town at the foot of the Himalayas. Only ﬁve
years later in 2006 the market price was 86 rupees per kilogram (approx 2.16 USD) in Sikkim
and 100 rupees per kilogram in Siliguri (approx 2.50 USD). Bentley, ‘Change and Culture
Revival’, 69.
83Government of Sikkim and Lama, Sikkim Human Development Report 2001, 51.
84Bentley, ‘Change and Culture Revival’, 69.
85Head of the Community Welfare Department in Dzongu, interview conducted by the
author, November 26, 2008, Passingdang, Sikkim, India.
86Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 1, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
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gestured to the empty ﬁelds in the hills behind him and added ‘who else would
want this land?’87 It is unclear, however, how the dam will replace the income
from cardamom. Respondents representing the hydropower company suggested
that the majority of jobs on the dam will be for local people,88 and this is also
clearly stated in the MoU. Several high-level positions have gone to well-educated
Lepchas. However, visits to the construction sites revealed a more mixed picture.
Most of the construction workers, dynamiters, and engineers were people from
outside Dzongu and in most cases outside Sikkim. There were some groups of
local Lepchas employed to clear and level land, though they indicated that this
work was sporadic. Rather than providing jobs on the dam itself it is more likely
the appeal of the dam comes from the opportunities for income from tourism,
new services such as the bank, better roads, increased business for local suppliers,
and in the rents paid to landowners; which will be accessible to certain Dzongu
residents and not others. Regardless, the dam has been framed by its supporters
as a boon for Dzongu, a way of making up for what the state has failed to
deliver in the past and for the decline of cardamom.
Third, pro-dam supporters are making claims over voice and legitimacy among
the Lepcha population. Much of the resentment for the anti-dam movement
developed from people in Dzongu feeling they were being spoken for by Lepchas
from outside. One respondent complained that Lepchas from outside Dzongu view
the area as a site of pure and traditional Lepcha culture and want Dzongu Lepchas
to remain faithful to traditions while they lived comfortable lives elsewhere.89 Some
respondents were also very cynical about claims made by the anti-dam movement
about the threat to sacred sites, arguing that this is a corruption of Lepcha sacral
traditions to support their own politics.90 Respondents argued that they should be
able to decide whether they wanted development and how they would deal with its
impacts. There was a strong sense that they felt patronised by other Lepcha groups
who cast them as naı¨ve and unable to see the long-term impact of the project.91 As
the anti-dam movement emerged and began making claims about the future of
Dzongu it reinforced the construction of a passive and primitive Lepcha community
that could not speak nor decide on its own future. This is a sensitive issue given the
primacy of the ‘backward’ construction. Key to this is the notion of being
‘underdeveloped’. Lepchas in Dzongu are very aware of the ways they are
represented. The Panan dam has been framed, perhaps intentionally and somewhat
manipulatively, as a way to combat the backward stereotype and bring Dzongu on
par with communities in other parts of Sikkim. Furthermore, many felt that Lepchas
in Dzongu were facing the burden of preserving Lepcha identity for the entire
87Head of the Community Welfare Department in Dzongu, interview conducted by the
author, November 26, 2008, Passingdang, Sikkim, India.
88Employee of the Himagiri Hydropower Company 1, interview conducted by the author,
November 27, 2008, Laven, Sikkim, India.
89Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 3, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
90Former Head of the Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarjum, interview conducted by the author,
November 19, 2008, Gangtok, Sikkim, India; Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 1, interview
conducted by the author, November 26, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
91Member of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum 1, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India; Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 2, interview conducted
by the author, November 26, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
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Lepcha population of the Himalayas.92 There is clearly an intra-ethnic contest for
legitimacy taking place.93
Fourth, supporters of the dam exercised collective agency in bargaining with the
state. They have not simply taken what the state has oﬀered, but have bargained for
a deal they believe will beneﬁt the people of Dzongu. The dam proponents have
negotiated a strong MoU with the state and the hydropower company. The MoU is
viewed as such a good deal that respondents claimed that it has fuelled resentment
towards Dzongu residents.94 The eight-point agenda of the MoU, with a further 61
sub-points and stipulations, is extensive. Local leaders involved in setting the
conditions of the MoU insist the content was formulated with wide community
consultation;95 though details of this process were diﬃcult to ascertain. Once the
MoU was formulated it became easier for the pro-dam network to demonstrate the
beneﬁts of the project to members of the community.96 As one respondent admitted,
after the MoU was agreed it was far easier to gain support for the project as people
were able to see that the fears they had about migration and degradation would be
addressed and new opportunities for economic and social development would be
provided.97 Interestingly those involved in the negotiation of the MoU felt the anti-
dam movement gave them a stronger bargaining position with the state and they
were able to extract much more favourable conditions.98 There is also a sense of
empowerment among the pro-dam network that they were able to gain such
favourable concessions from the state.99 In accepting the dam the pro-dam network
has attempted to assure the autonomy of Dzongu; both vis-a`-vis the state and also
vis-a`-vis more politically vocal Lepcha groups.
It is the negotiation itself that is crucial and perhaps most transferable to other
contexts in Asia and beyond. The MoU now acts as a precedent for negotiating
directly with the state, which is signiﬁcant for a community regarded externally and
even internally as backward and subject to the protectionist whims of the
Government of Sikkim. Members of this small community were able to negotiate
directly with the state; they were able to be part of legitimate high-stakes politics.
Whether it is sustained beyond negations over a high-stakes development project
92Member of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum 1, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
93Interestingly, the pro-dam network itself, particularly MLAS is not beyond using the
‘backward construction’ to reinforce its own claims to speak on behalf of the Lepchas of
Dzongu and to ensure the extent of the impacts of the dam are adequately compensated for.
Respondents constantly referred to the people of area as ‘simple’ and the MoU itself contains
references to the ‘innocent’ ‘aborigines’ that have made a ‘sacriﬁce for the national cause’.
94Former Head of the Renjyong Mutanchi Rong Tarjum, interview conducted by the author,
November 19, 2008, Gangtok, Sikkim, India; President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum,
interview conducted by the author, November 25, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India; Head of
Dzongu Gram Panchayat 1, interview conducted by the author, November 26, 2008,
Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
95President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum, interview conducted by the author, November
25, 2008, Mangan, Sikkim, India; Former President of the Mutanchi Lom Aal Shezum,
interview conducted by the author, November 26, 2008, Passingdang, Sikkim, India.
96Head of Dzongu Gram Panchayat 1, interview conducted by the author, November 26,
2008, Tingvong, Sikkim, India.
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
99This was a view expressed by all respondents supporting the dam in both Dzongu and
Gangtok.
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remains to be seen. Indeed, the MoU may never be fully realised, as is typical for
ethnic minority communities subject to guarantees from development projects.
However, many of these communities are never consulted, never negotiate, never
bargain, and never use the leverage of the MoU to push through their demands. The
Lepchas of Dzongu did all of this, and the signiﬁcance of this should not be
understated for a ‘vanishing tribe’. Whether the MoU reveals co-option, manipula-
tion, window-dressing, lies, or genuine response to community demands is hard to
fathom until the project moves along further. What is important is that it provides
the feeling among those aﬀected that they gained concessions from the state that are
in the interests of all Lepchas in Dzongu. This has spread the idea that the future of
Dzongu will be decided by the people within it, rather than outside it, regardless of
their ethnicity.
Conclusion
Examining the pro-dam network in Dzongu provides an alternative narrative of
collective agency among the Lepcha ethnic minority. This alternative narrative has
four main elements that call for further investigation of pro-development actors
among ethnic minorities in other contexts. First, examining pro-development actors
breaks the homogeneity of the ‘united front’ view of state–ethnic minority relations
and shifts the focus to intra-ethnic relationships. Multiple agendas are commonly
recognised in contentious politics, yet when it comes to ethnic minorities,
particularly numerically small groups like the Lepcha, there is a tendency to
homogenise. This is particularly evident when a visible movement among an ethnic
minority already ﬁts the familiar narrative of adversarial resistance, obscuring intra-
ethnic dynamics. As the case of Dzongu has demonstrated, the claims of pro-
development actors revealed key ﬁssures among Lepchas over voice, legitimacy, and
authenticity, and these ﬁssures themselves reveal major material and ideational
chasms over development needs, identity, and the divisive impact of the ‘vanishing
tribe’ discourse. Second, collective agency of ethnic minorities is not ﬁxed in a
particular relationship with the state nor does it have a particular position on
development. These are both ﬂuid and responsive. This may sound obvious, yet
adversarial relationships between ethnic minorities and the state and oppositional
positions to development are the default characteristics most attractive to analysis of
ethnic minority agency. The case of Dzongu also indicates that engagement itself can
be an important end of collective agency for ethnic minorities who have rarely been
aﬀorded attention by the state, and in this case subject to paternalistic though
infrequent development interventions. Third, while attention is drawn to the crucial
junctures when contentious development projects are planned and opposed, the
long-term experience of development and the state is crucial. To be sure, the
experience of development in Dzongu has been far from positive. Long-term neglect
by the state and the sudden decline of the cardamom crop has created widespread
insecurity, yet in this context the dam provides an alternative at a time when no other
options appear forthcoming. The fact that it takes a potentially hazardous
hydropower project to address this causes consternation outside Dzongu, but for
those living with the material realities of life in Dzongu it has become a way to
address insecurity that experience has taught them will not be addressed otherwise,
despite the conceivable ecological disasters that may ensue. Last, the analysis of pro-
development actors creates dilemmas for researchers and may explain why the
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familiar narrative is so attractive. The dilemma of giving a voice to proponents of
potentially hazardous and environmentally destructive projects is not easily resolved
and was a constant challenge throughout this research. However, in the case of
Dzongu it is diﬃcult to simply deny what appears to be a genuine support for the
project and its associated promises. While support for the dam emanates strongly
from inﬂuential status quo actors, it is insuﬃcient to decry the support and
mobilisation shown for the dam as wholly owing to manipulation, co-option, or a
form of false consciousness. It is unlikely that hydropower will address the problems
people in Dzongu face, but it is perceived to address some of them. Most people
spoken to in Dzongu who support the dam know there are risks but also see
development itself as a fundamentally risky process, and an inevitable process; at
least with this dam they feel they have struck a bargain that enables some control
over the course development takes. Even more important is that Lepchas in Dzongu
are able to make claims regarding their own future, rather than people from outside
Dzongu and outside Sikkim, including other Lepchas, telling them how they should
live. No matter how diﬃcult the dilemmas raised by pro-development actors it is
even more diﬃcult to dismiss these voices as spurious.
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